Welcome to War and Tactics! War and Tactics Forum is currently undergoing some modifications that might disable features you are used to. This is unabvoidable as we have to update the forum engine to a new structure that is incompatible with many of the features we had used so far. The good news: WaT will be more secure and stable, and most of the features we uninstalled will be a natural part of the new structure anyway. For the rest we will be looking for solutions. (APR 23, 2018)
RUS-UKR war SITREP AUG17 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 17, 2023
Cutoff: 171630Zaug23
Key Takeaways:
- “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky suggested that Russia freeze the war in Ukraine along the current frontlines, reintroducing a narrative that had been largely dormant since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion.
Khodakovsky stated that Russia will not be able to topple Ukraine militarily in the near term and that Russian forces are unlikely to easily occupy additional Ukrainian cities, echoing comments Prigozhin had made in April 2023.[1] Khodakovsky concluded that Russia will likely have to come to a “truce” and that Russia may enter a phase “of neither peace nor war” with Ukraine.[2] Khodakovsky suggested that Ukraine would be sufficiently weakened in this state of frozen conflict and that Russia would be able to exert more influence over Ukraine in such a situation than it currently can during the ”Special Military Operation.”
- Khodakovsky commands forces defending in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and his comments about freezing the war follow the Ukrainian liberation of Urozhaine on August 16, suggesting that recent Ukrainian advances may be significantly weakening confidence in the Russian defense along the wider front in southern Ukraine. - Recent Ukrainian advances near small settlements in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast are likely tactically significant because of the structure of Russian defensive lines. - Russian forces have dedicated significant effort, resources, and personnel to hold settlements such as Robotyne and Urozhaine, and recent Ukrainian advances in these areas are therefore likely reflective of a wider degradation of defending Russian forces. - Russian efforts to ramp up the domestic production of Iranian Shahed-136/-131 drones indicate that Russia aims to develop the long-term capability to conduct large strike series in Ukraine. - Russian reports about the state of the Chonhar Bridge in occupied Kherson Oblast indicate that Ukrainian strikes disrupted a major Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) to Crimea for 11 days. - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on August 17 and advanced in certain areas. - Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 17 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
RUS-UKR war SITREP AUG16 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 16, 2023
Cutoff: 161630Zaug23
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 16 and advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border. - Ukrainian reports and video released by Ukrainian troops confirm that Ukrainian forces liberated Urozhaine, on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border, on August 16. - Russian sources are prematurely asserting that Ukrainian forces have committed their entire “main reserves” to counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast based on scattered observations of western-equipped Ukrainian units. - Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 15 to 16, primarily targeting grain and port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast. - The first civilian vessel traveled through a Ukrainian-created temporary corridor for civilian vessels in the Black Sea on August 16 as part of Ukrainian efforts to circumvent Russian attempts to further curtail maritime traffic. - Russian ultranationalists are increasingly criticizing Russian military command for failing to recruit and train effective middle-level military officers to lead Russian forces on the frontlines in Ukraine. - Russian senators proposed an amendment to ban the distribution of photos and videos containing information about Russian military activities and locations on August 16, amplifying a recent trend of cracking down on public imagery of the war. - The Russian MoD may be using the Army-2023 Forum in Moscow to coerce countries into refusing to cooperate with the Wagner Group and to advertise Russian MoD-controlled private military companies (PMCs). - Russian sources claimed that the Russian military command placed nominal Russian deputy theater commander in Ukraine and notable Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin under house arrest as of early August. - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make any confirmed advances.
RUS-UKR war SITREP AUG15 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 15, 2023
Cutoff: 151600Zaug23
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 15 and reportedly advanced in Luhansk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast. - Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike against targets mainly in Ukrainian rear areas on the night of August 14-15. - The Kremlin is using the Army-2023 forum in Moscow (August 14-20) to foster bilateral military and political relations with other states and posture itself as a reliable and technologically advanced partner. - Russian President Vladimir Putin and Shoigu made largely boilerplate comments framing the Russian government as effectively meeting Russian force generation efforts, portraying Western and Ukrainian resources as limited, and promoting international cooperation against the West. - Wagner Group affiliated sources are undermining private military companies (PMCs) affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). - Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to comment on Wagner issues on the African continent to remain active in the information space but is notably refraining from commenting on the war in Ukraine. - Russian news outlet Kommersant reported that Russian authorities are developing a mechanism to fully control and shut off civilian mobile telecommunications networks in the event of a declared emergency, possibly related to pro-Ukrainian cross border raids. - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and reportedly advanced near Svatove and Bakhmut. - Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on August 15 and reportedly advanced in Luhansk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast. - The Russian “Vostok” Battalion, which is notably fighting near Urozhaine claimed on August 15 that Russian forces have entirely lost Urozhaine and blamed a lack of infantry and equipment for the loss of the settlement, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from the town. - The Russian federal subject “Bashkortostan Regiment” volunteer formation has reportedly deployed to Ukraine. - Russian authorities continue to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian cultural and educational sphere.
The Analyis explores the challenges of combined arms obstacle breaching in southern Ukraine, and why mines pose such a significant challenge.
Key Takeaways (by Gen. Ryan himself)
Quote
The operations to penetrate the Russian defences in southern Ukraine have been subject to much scrutiny. Observations such as the lack of Ukrainian air power, poor training or insufficient Western equipment have been offered. These have played a role.
But there is a more fundamental reason why operations are proceeding slowly. While military technology has advanced in the past few decades, the tactics and technologies for detecting, clearing and penetrating minefields has not advanced in the past 50 years.
Two recent technological developments have widened the gap between the challenge of breaching minefields and existing solutions.
The first is that battlefield observation is now pervasive. This war has seen the development of a meshed civil-military network of sensors, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. This is unprecedented & not a factor when extant obstacle-breaching doctrine was developed.
The second development is digitised control of fire support. Long range rockets, artillery, attack helicopters, loitering munitions, & electronic warfare are now synchronised with new-era digitised battle command systems, which are in turn linked to the meshed sensor network. Consequently, where decades ago it may have taken some time for an enemy to detect someone conducting a breach of their obstacles and even longer to bring them under fire, this is now a process that takes a minute or two.
This represents an intellectual failure by western nations. We have not anticipated the application of this new meshed sensor-fires complex to modern ground operations over the past couple of decades. There were months where we observed Russian defences being constructed. At the same time, the past year has made clear trends in the reduction of time between detection and destruction on the modern battlefield. Yet still we failed to update the tactics and techniques of breaching minefields.
While Ukraine has adapted its clearance techniches, Western military institutions should establish a crash program to develop technologies for minefield detection and clearance that offer significant improvement in the speed and quality of such activities.
However, the physical means to assist is just the beginning. Doctrinal innovation is required to explore tactics of undertaking opposed minefield detection and neutralisation more quickly, without a guarantee of air control.
3rd Separate Assault Brigade (3 OShBr) is one the most successful brigades in the Ukrainian Army. Since the beginning of May it has advanced about 6-7 kilometres south-west of the outskirts of Bakhmut. This article describes 3 OShBr’s summer campaign to date – how it has achieved its advances and why success over twelve weeks on the eastern battlefields of Ukraine is measured in metres gained and not tens of kilometres.
Key Takeways:
The explanations for 3OShBr’s slow advance do not lie in mine belts and defensive obstacles which are slowing down the Ukrainian counter-offensive on the Zaphorizhzhia front. Russian forces never built these in this sector, as they were advancing with the intent to capture Bakhmut and the surrounding area. The three principal reasons for the slow tempo are:
• Casualty aversion: 3 OShBr has been pursuing a deliberate policy of re-capturing ground, incurring no or few casualties. This goal has been achieved but has reduced the tempo of Ukrainian operations.
• Soldier weights: In an infantry war, an assault can only advance as far as a soldier of average fitness can fight before exhaustion sets in.
• Artillery: Artillery (and rocket) fire is still accounting for four in five casualties. This may explain why of 100 Ukrainian soldiers wounded within 3 miles of the front line, 36% are very seriously wounded (shrapnel wounds). After capturing a Russian strongpoint or trench line, Ukrainian troops perforce must remain in place as the standard Russian response is to bombard the lost positions. In one recent case, Ukrainian soldiers had to share the trenches with the Russian dead which could not be moved (not least because the departing Russians, who not uncommonly abandon their dead, had booby-trapped the corpses). The only option was to cover the corpses with plastic sheets which due to the cramped conditions were used as ‘soft’ seats, while smoking heavily to disguise the smells. A Ukrainian soldier asked whether he was not afraid one of bodies might suddenly detonate, replied; ‘Everything is detonating here.’
RUS-UKR war SITREP AUG14 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14, 2023
Cutoff: 141700Zaug23
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 14 and reportedly advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. - Crimean occupation authorities are attempting to impose new federal penalties on individuals who publish content revealing the locations and operations of Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, likely in response to Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign. - Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14. - The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely remains unable to fully take control of some Russian private military companies which are affiliated with or receive sponsorship from Russian officials and businessmen. - US officials announced a new $200 million security assistance package for Ukraine on August 14. - Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Bakhmut. - Russian sources continue to claim that Ukrainian forces hold limited positions on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to cross to the east bank of the Dnipro River on small boats near the Antonivsky Bridge and Kozachi Laheri.[56] Russian sources amplified footage of a Russian Su-24 bomber flying over Kherson Oblast and speculated that it was striking Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge or Kozachi Laheri.[57] - Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupyansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk. - The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) continues to form new regiments and appoint prominent Russian ultranationalists to command its units, possibly in an effort to incentivize recruitment. - Russian authorities are removing local officials in occupied territories of Ukraine likely in order to fill openings with preferred candidates in the upcoming regional elections.
RUS-UKR war SITREP AUG13 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2023
Cutoff: 131600Zaug23
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 13 and reportedly advanced in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. - ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have completely withdrawn from Urozhaine and Russian forces likely currently maintain positions in at least the southern part of the settlement. - The Russian information space is seizing on Ukrainian gains in Urozhaine (in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) to highlight poor Russian morale and command challenges in the area. - A Russian warship forcibly stopped and searched a civilian cargo ship en route to the Izmail port in Odesa Oblast, likely as part of a Kremlin effort to curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports without committing naval assets to fully enforce a blockade. - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and attempted to regain lost positions near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and reportedly advanced in some areas. - Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and reportedly advanced in several areas. - The Wagner Group is likely downsizing and reconfiguring to adapt to financial pressure following the June 24 Wagner rebellion. - Ukrainian partisans claimed to have attacked a Russian military base in occupied Mariupol on August 13.
Ukraine released a compilation of USV footage today. Here are the details (Twitter thread by Michael Bond @HelloMrBond). Contains great graphics about evolution of UKR maritime drones.
4 of attack on the Priazovye 3 of attack on the Ivan Khurs 4 of attack on Vasily Bykov, Sergey Kotov & Sparta IV 1 unknown engagement
Do you spend your day answering emails, ticking off training objectives and signing forms, or are you pursuing organisational priorities and building valuable things?
Much of our working day appears to be mired in process and fighting off bureaucracy. From mandated online training designed to trap the user in digital hell to endless risk assessments, commanders feel held back from investing time in learning and practising how to fight better by the very organisation which wants them to fight better.
It is too easy to blame process. As with any large organisation, it proliferates and multiplies, until the bureaucracy becomes too much to bear. But, it isn’t process per se that is the problem, it is our dysfunctional relationship with process that is all wrong. As an organisation, we have erred towards a risk-averse, process-driven culture that treats process as the ends rather than the means. Our obsession with this is prioritising convenience over imagination, and this is actively harming our ability to think and adapt. To get back on track, we need to ask if our behaviour is aligning with our long term goals and objectives. Purpose must drive the process, not the other way around. (…)
