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Ukraine’s Operations in Bakhmut Have Kept Russian Reserves Away from the South

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Special Edition

By Daniel Mealie, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaway: Ukrainian forces are celebrating the liberation of two small towns south of Bakhmut, but Ukraine’s entire effort first to defend and now to conduct counter-offensive operations around Bakhmut has been the subject of much unwarranted criticism. Ukraine's defensive and counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area since summer 2022 are an operationally sound undertaking that has fixed a large amount of Russian combat power that would otherwise have been available to reinforce Russian defenses in southern Ukraine. Elements of two of Russia’s four Airborne (VDV) divisions and three of Russia’s four VDV separate brigades are currently defending the Bakhmut area. This significant Ukrainian achievement has helped prevent Russia from creating a large mobile VDV operational reserve that could have been used to stop the main Ukrainian counteroffensive effort in Zaporizhia Oblast. Continued large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts around Bakhmut are necessary to keep Russian forces fixed in that area, as the likely recent redeployment of a detachment of one VDV separate brigade from near Bakhmut to southern Ukraine shows how eager the Russians are to recoup the combat power that the Ukrainian counteroffensive around Bakhmut is fixing there.

Ukraine’s defensive operations in Bakhmut drew elements of at least one Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) division and fixed them near Bakhmut in summer 2022. Elements of the 106th Airborne Division were reportedly operating in Bakhmut as early as June 2022. Former Russian officer Igor Girkin reported that the 137th Airborne Regiment of the 106th Airborne Division had been operating in Bakhmut alongside Wagner forces since the “beginning” of Wagner’s assault on Bakhmut, presumably in June 2022 when Wagner’s participation in major attacks to capture the town began.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 137th Airborne Regiment were already operating near Bakhmut as of September 14, 2022.[2]

The Russian military committed elements of the 106th Airborne Division to augment the Wagner Group’s offensive in Bakhmut no later than December 2022. Combat footage posted in December 2022 and January 2023 shows likely elements of the 106th Airborne Division engaged in combat in Bakhmut.[3] A Russian milblogger reported that unspecified VDV forces conducted joint operations with the Wagner Group in the Bakhmut area on December 27, 2022.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed Russian Airborne Forces’ participation in the battle of Bakhmut – very likely including elements of the 106th Airborne Division – in January 2023.[5]

The Russian military deployed additional VDV units to Bakhmut in early- and mid-May 2023 shortly before Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s announcement that Wagner forces would withdraw from Bakhmut. The tempo of combat in Bakhmut decreased in April and early May 2023 as Russian forces completed their capture of the city. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut on May 20 and announced his intent to withdraw Wagner forces from the town on May 25.[6] Prigozhin announced on May 25 that the Wagner Group began handing over its positions in Bakhmut to the Russian Ministry of Defense and claimed that Wagner would entirely withdraw from the town on June 1, 2023.[7]

Additional VDV forces deployed to Bakhmut before and during this transitional period. Senior Ukrainian defense officials reported that the Russian military deployed several unspecified VDV units to Bakhmut in mid-May 2023.[8] A Russian soldier’s obituary confirms that elements of the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade deployed to Bakhmut – likely from the Svatove-Kreminna line - no later than May 14, 2023.[9] Ukrainian sources reported that elements of Russia’s 98th Airborne Division deployed to Bakhmut in late March and mid-April.[10] Scattered small elements of the 98th Airborne Division were reportedly operating near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, and Dibrova, Luhansk Oblast, as of May 2023.[11] Combat footage and Russian reports confirmed that elements of Russia’s 98th Airborne Division redeployed to Bakhmut no later than June 2023.[12] Elements of the 11th and 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigades likely deployed to Bakhmut around this time, and their participation in combat in Bakhmut was confirmed in June and July 2023.[13]

Ukrainian forces began counteroffensive operations against Bakhmut almost immediately following Wagner’s withdrawal, causing the Russians to maintain VDV forces already there and to deploy additional VDV reinforcements to Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces conducted sustained tactical counterattacks in Bakhmut and around its flanks following Wagner’s capture of the city around May 20.[14] Ukraine launched a significant counteroffensive against Bakhmut on June 4, the same day it began its major counteroffensive in Zaporizhia, and conducted sustained and reinvigorated offensive actions near Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks throughout June, July, and August.[15]

These sustained Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut fixed considerable VDV forces in Bakhmut. The Russian military had committed elements of the 11th, 31st, and 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigades to the defense of the town by July 2023.[16] The only VDV separate brigade not committed to Bakhmut was the 45th Guards SPETSNAZ Brigade, which is a special forces unit directly controlled by the Russian General Staff.[17] The Russian military would not have deployed and retained this large quantity of VDV forces in Bakhmut had Ukrainian forces not launched large-scale and effective counteroffensive operations that threatened to retake the town that Russian forces had seized at enormous cost. Russian sources credited elements of the 98th Airborne Division - likely elements of the 217th Airborne Regiment - with defeating Ukrainian attacks on Bakhmut’s northern flank in July 2023.[18] Elements of the 106th Airborne Division's 137th Airborne Regiment remained in Bakhmut from September 2022 to September 2023 without any observed evidence of a rotation.[19] 

Ukraine's continued counteroffensive actions in Bakhmut since June 2023 have fixed elements of two of Russia’s four VDV divisions and three of the VDV’s four separate brigades, dramatically reducing the VDV’s ability to redeploy more forces laterally to reinforce the southern front. The fact that the Russian command redeployed these VDV forces to hold Bakhmut shows that they would have been available to shift to Zaporizhia Oblast to defend against the main Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts there had Ukrainian operations not fixed them in the Bakhmut area.

Ukraine’s sustained operations near Bakhmut have fixed the following VDV elements near Bakhmut:

    • Both of the 106th Airborne Division’s maneuver regiments likely remain near Bakhmut as of early September 2023.[20]
        • Elements of the 137th Regiment were reported near Bakhmut as of early September 2023.[21]
        • Elements of the 51st Regiment reportedly remained near Bakhmut as of late August 2023. [22]
        • One of the 98th Airborne Division’s two maneuver regiments likely remains fixed in Bakhmut as of early September 2023.[23]
        • The 217th Regiment’s last reported whereabouts are in Bakhmut as of early August.[24] ISW has not observed evidence of the 217th Regiment redeploying as of this publication.
        • Elements of the 11th Separate Air Assault Brigade remained in the Bakhmut area as of early September 2023.[25]
        • Elements of the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade remained in the Bakhmut area as of early September 2023.[26]
        • Elements of the 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigade remained in the Bakhmut area as of early September 2023.[27]

Sources and Details: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-operations-bakhmut-have-kept-russian-reserves-away-south

RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 17 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17, 2023

Cutoff: 171700Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian forces  liberated Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, on September 17 and continued successful offensive operations elsewhere in the Bakhmut direction.
    - Russian forces launched another series of Shahed-131/136 drone and cruise missile strikes at southern Ukraine on the night of September 16-17.
    - North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un concluded his trip to Russia on September 17 and received several pieces of military technical equipment from the governor of Primorsky Krai.
    - The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to subsume the Wagner Group is prompting Russian officials to more openly back military juntas in West Africa.
    - Prolonged concern about Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s health in the Russian information space highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dependence on Kadyrov for continued stability in Chechnya.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast area on September 17 and advanced in some areas.
    - Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
    - Recent Russian claims that small contingents of former Wagner Group personnel are returning to fight in Ukraine do not indicate that a fully reconstituted Wagner fighting force will return to Ukraine anytime soon if ever.
    - Russian occupation administrations continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia and erase Ukrainian cultural identity.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2023

RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 16 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 16, 2023

Cutoff: 161700Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on September 16 and continued to make gains in the area.
    - Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast have likely forced the Russian command to prioritize the Russian defense there and laterally redeploy elements of a relatively elite formation away from the Russian defense south of Bakhmut.
    - Ukrainian forces also advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 16 and continued to penetrate the Russian defensive layer that lies ahead of the current extent of Ukrainian advances.
    - Ukrainian forces have likely made a significant tactical breach along a section of the current Russian defense layer in the Robotyne area over the past several weeks that they continue to widen.
    - Russian ultranationalists continued to complain about endemic lying within the Russian military after Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev voiced similar complaints on September 15.
    - A Ukrainian naval drone strike likely damaged a Russian ship in the Black Sea on September 14.
    - A Ukrainian official confirmed on September 16 that a civilian vessel used the Ukrainian corridor in the Black Sea to reach a Ukrainian port for the first time.
    - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met in Vladivostok, where Kim viewed pieces of Russian weapons technology on September 16.
    - The Russian military leadership may be removing ineffective air defense officials on the pretext of corruption charges to avoid admitting the failures of Russian air defenses against increasing drone strikes on Russian cities including Moscow.
    - Russian military officials continue efforts to solidify Russia’s relationship with African states amidst changing dynamics on the continent resulting from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) efforts to subsume the Wagner Group.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia on September 16 and advanced in some areas.
    - Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 16 and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
    - Russian milbloggers continue complaining about the role of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in perpetuating issues affecting Russian military personnel.
    - Russian occupation officials continue efforts to resettle residential areas of occupied Ukraine with Russians.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2023

RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 13 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 13, 2023

Cutoff: 131700Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian forces conducted missile strikes on occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, on September 13, damaging a Russian landing ship, a Kilo class submarine, and port infrastructure.
    - Ukrainian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut amid continued counteroffensive operations on both sectors of the front on September 13.
    - Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting Sumy and Odesa oblasts on the night of September 12 to 13.
    - Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely concerned that Russia’s growing relationship with North Korea may endanger Russia’s existing sanctions evasion schemes.
    - The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly temporarily disrupted a Wagner Group force rotation to Syria amid reports of the Russian MoD’s ongoing efforts to subsume Wagner operations in Syria.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances.
    - Reports from Western and Russian independent sources indicate that Russia has circumvented some Western sanctions to increase weapons production but still struggles to produce weapons at the pace required by the war in Ukraine.
    - The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage showing GUR and Ukrainian partisans conducting a drone strike on a Russian occupation passportization office in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast on September 12.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2023

RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 11 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2023

Cutoff: 111630Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 11 and have reportedly advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
    - The Rosgvardia may be recruiting previously imprisoned former Wagner Group fighters, likely to further subsume Wagner remnants while bolstering Russia’s domestic security apparatus.
    - Russian border guards expressed similar grievances about limited capabilities and equipment to those voiced by Russian troops serving in Ukraine and continued to express concern over potential Ukrainian raids into Russia.
    - The Kremlin’s ruling United Russia party unsurprisingly achieved most of its desired results in highly fraudulent local elections in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
    - North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Vladivostok in the coming days, likely to discuss bilateral relations and North Korea’s supplies of artillery munitions to Russia.
    - US and Armenian forces began joint military exercises in Armenia on September 11.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 11.
    - Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least one sector of the front on September 11 and advanced near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
    - Russian Central Election Committee Head Alexander Sidyakin unsurprisingly claimed that United Russia received the majority of votes in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
    - Ukrainian and United Kingdom military officials reported on September 11 that the Russian military intends to mobilize over 400,000 personnel by the end of 2023.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2023

RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 10 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 10, 2023

Cutoff: 101600Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian forces continued to advance south of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on September 10.
    - Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov stated on September 10 that Ukrainian forces will continue counteroffensive operations into late 2023. Cold and wet weather will affect but not halt active combat, as it has done in the first 18 months of the war.
    - Russian military personnel continue to detail persistent problems hindering Russian operations along the frontline in Ukraine.
    - Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/-136 drone strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast on the night of September 9 to 10.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly regained some lost positions in some areas.
    - Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on September 10 that the Russian military has concentrated over 420,000 military personnel in occupied Ukraine, not including Rosgvardia (Russian national guard) and other military units and structures.
    - Russian occupation officials held the final day of voting for Russian regional elections in occupied territories on September 10, continuing efforts to coerce residents to vote and portray the elections as legitimate.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2023

RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 08 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 8, 2023

Cutoff: 081730Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Russian forces have reportedly made notable changes to their command and control (C2) in Ukraine to protect command infrastructure and improve information sharing, although Russian force deployments are likely still exacerbating issues with horizontal integration.
    - Artillery constraints in Ukraine are reportedly prompting the Russian military to accelerate longstanding efforts to implement a fires doctrine prioritizing accuracy over volume.
    - Russian forces are additionally reportedly adapting their deployment of electronic warfare (EW) complexes.
    - Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to advance south of Bakhmut and south of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains on September 8.
    - Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of September 7–8.
    - Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly rejected an incredibly favorable offer from the UN Secretariat that met many of Russia’s stated demands to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative on September 6, indicating that the Kremlin is either delaying its return to the grain deal in an attempt to extract maximum concessions from the West or has no intention whatsoever of returning to the grain deal.
    - The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) directly responded to recent indications that the Armenian government may be questioning its decades-long security relationship with Russia.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not make any confirmed advances on September 8.
    - The New York Times (NYT) — citing Western, African, and Russian sources — reported that Russian intelligence structures are competing for control of the Wagner Group’s assets and operations in Africa.
    - Russian occupation officials continue to hold illegal regional elections in occupied Ukraine. Russian occupation officials in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts announced the start of in-person voting in occupied territories on September 8.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2023

RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 05 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2023

Cutoff: 051630Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian forces continue to advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
    - Russian sources continue to complain that Russian forces lack sufficient counterbattery capabilities and artillery munitions in the face of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive activities, which the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are reportedly attempting to combat.
    - Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area are likely succeeding in pinning elements of the 7th Guards Mountain Airborne (VDV) Division and preventing them from laterally redeploying to critical areas of the front in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
    - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated boilerplate rhetoric intended to dismiss recent Ukrainian advances and highlight the beginning of a new academic year for Russian military institutions during a meeting with Russian military leadership on September 5.
    - Russian President Vladimir Putin drew historical parallels between Soviet participation in the Second World War and the current war in Ukraine to set ideological expectations for a prolonged war effort.
    - The Armenian government appears to be seriously questioning its decades-long security relationship with Russia, amid reports of Armenian humanitarian aid to Ukraine and increasing public dissatisfaction with Russia’s security guarantees.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 5.
    - Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front and advanced near Bakhmut, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 5.
    - Russian sources continue to report on Russian efforts to recruit volunteers amid continued rumors of general mobilization.
    - The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reportedly attempted to assassinate a Russian occupation official in occupied Luhansk Oblast on September 5.


Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2023

RUS-UKR war SITREP SEP 04 2023 - Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2023

Cutoff: 041700Zsep23

Key Takeaways:

    - Ukrainian light infantry has advanced to positions beyond anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles that comprise the current Russian defensive layer ahead of the Ukrainian advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces likely intend to hold those positions. ISW is not prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have breached this Russian defensive layer in the absence of observed Ukrainian heavy equipment in these areas.
    - Russian forces reportedly attempted to expand minefields in southern Ukraine following the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in June.
    - Limitations on Russian artillery capabilities and Ukrainian advantages in counter-battery fire are forcing the Russians to deviate from their own doctrine, RUSI reported.
    - Russian forces conducted a drone strike on Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts on the night of September 3-4.
    - Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative until all of Russia’s extensive terms are met at a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
    - Head of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Erik Mose stated on September 4 that the commission has not yet concluded that Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine.
    - Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 4.
    - Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 4.
    - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on September 4 that the Russian military will not be holding “Zapad-2023” joint strategic exercises scheduled for September.
    - Russian occupation officials continued the fifth day of early voting for Russian regional elections in occupied territories on September 4.

Details, Maps and Sources: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2023

NY Times article on small assault group tactics (no paywall, shared by a subscriber as gift article)



https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-russia-counteroffensive.html?unlocked_article_code=_6EX0JNyjr2WI5DpuuH1XvznqIN0qkdMxKcfm4Stq5uPkmM6xCwgG-9P6UYH3GMLibhNCKFs49RImzKE2GJKsmUITYCosLo4tBFYMJIZcotsYMHxW48iRIJysFrEd0DkvQoAIS2SMW3rN2ksqQgTzDMdzjB4464HQR0IYbd8GDuc1_lNI7uu2oPpq5WI7V2UJtzFL68GER8XHHJomv54d-G2UL_v6z-_F-qMMzsfqtMhLcRXy3l0aquQ-HBYPdunif8SSt45zu8yvhp7yb_iPtqYENfPNsy2MMokCq3_BaP0aXHa6pec4hm9-uhdx9rG2ANkcnmoRCUgXyWheFPr6w6OU2sKEK6z8h2k7eiv&smid=tw-share